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7KHGHPDQGLQJQHVVRI1R]LFN¶Vµ/RFNHDQ¶SURYLVR 
 
,QWHUSUHWHUV RI 5REHUW 1R]LFN¶V SROLWLFDO SKLORVRSK\ IDOO LQWR WZR
EURDG JURXSV FRQFHUQLQJ KLV DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH µ/RFNHDQ SURYLVR¶
Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances 
of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been 
in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument 
in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make 
people worse off than they would have been in a world without that 
particular ownership are unjust. While I argue that the former reading 
is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is 
nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is 
demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of non-
human animals; if such beings are right-bearers, as more and more 
academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no non-arbitrary 
reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso. 
 
Keywords: Robert Nozick, Lockean proviso, right libertarianism, 
animal rights, property rights, climate change, non-identity problem 
 
In the last few years, there has been a small increase of interest in the philosophy of 
Robert Nozick, with a number of authors critically but sympathetically engaging with 
his political thought. Papers approaching Nozick in this way are offered in Ralf M. 
%DGHUDQG-RKQ0HDGRZFURIW¶VHGLWHGFROOHFWLRQRQAnarchy, State and Utopia. 
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A recurring interpretative problem, and one frequently present in the background of 
%DGHUDQG0HDGRZFURIW¶VDQWKRORJ\VXUURXQGV1R]LFN¶VXVHRIWKHVR-FDOOHGµ/RFNHDQ¶
SURYLVR7KH/RFNHDQSURYLVRVHUYHVDVDSRWHQWLDOOLPLWRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VIUHHGRPRI
unrestrained acquisition, be that appropriation of the unowned or the accumulation of 
holdings through legitimate transfer (purchase, inheritance, etc). Interpretations of this 
important aspect of Anarchy, State and Utopia (ASU) fall broadly into two groups. 
1R]LFN¶V SURYLVR FDQ HLWKHU EH VHHQ DV FRPSOHWHO\ XQGHPDQGLQJ PHDQLQJ WKDW in 
practice, there is no limit on acquisition, or so demanding that it would illegitimate 
basically all ownership. In this paper, I am first going to argue that the undemanding 
reading of the proviso is correct as an interpretation of Nozick, and that those who read 
1R]LFN¶VXVHRIWKHSURYLVRLQWKHKLJKO\GHPDQGLQJZD\DUHPLVWDNHQ+RZHYHU,ZLOO
WKHQDUJXH WKDWHYHQ WKLV µXQGHPDQGLQJ¶SURYLVR FRXOGRIIHU VLJQLILFDQWSURWHFWLRQ IRU
certain individuals, and therefore significant curtailment of acquisition and private 
property, in certain cases. In order to illustrate this point, I am going to examine the 
application of the proviso for the protection of non-human animals. 
 
7KHµ/RFNHDQ¶SURYLVR 
It is possible that a particularly ardent defence of capitaliVPRU LQ3HWHU9DOOHQW\QH¶V
ZRUGV D NLQG RI ³UDGLFDO ULJKW OLEHUWDULDQLVP´   ZRXOG VHW QR OLPLWV RQ
DFTXLVLWLRQ,IDQDJHQWZDVDEOHWRDFTXLUHDPRQRSRO\RQWKHZRUOG¶VVXSSO\RIZDWHU
so be it. If the capitalist was able to claim all foodstuffs in a vast barren landscape, so 
much the worse for those living there. However, Nozick follows John Locke by denying 
that appropriation or acquisition is always legitimate, endorsing a variation of the so 
FDOOHG ³/RFNHDQ SURYLVR´ ,Q KLV Two Treatises of Government, Locke writes that 
SHUVRQVPD\DSSURSULDWHREMHFWV WKURXJKPL[LQJ WKHLU ODERXUZLWK WKHREMHFW³DW OHDVW
ZKHUHWKHUHLVHQRXJKDQGDVJRRGOHIWLQFRPPRQIRURWKHUV´/RFNHXVHV
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the examples of acorns or apples taken from woodland (2003: §28), before going on to 
discuss at length the practice of enclosing the common land (2003: §32-4), a 
controversy contemporary to his work. Locke comes to the proto-libertarian conclusion 
WKDW ³QR PDQ¶V ODERXU FRXOG VXEGXH RU DSSURSULDWH DOO nor could his enjoyment 
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to 
intrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of 
his neighbour, who would still have room for as good and as large a possession (after 
WKHRWKHUKDGWDNHQRXWKLVDVEHIRUHLWZDVDSSURSULDWHG´ 
1R]LFN LV FOHDU WKDWKH ILQGV /RFNH¶VSURYLVR WREH DPELJXRXV 1R]LFN 
 EXW WKDW KH FRQVLGHUV ³DQ\ DGHTXDWH WKHRU\ RI DFTXLVLWLRQ´ WR KDYH D SUoviso 
³VLPLODU´ WR KRZ KH VD\V ZH PD\ LQWHUSUHW /RFNH 1R]LFN   1R]LFN LV
FRQFHUQHGZLWKVDWLVI\LQJ³WKHLQWHQWEHKLQGWKHµHQRXJKDQGDVJRRGOHIWRYHU¶SURYLVR´
(1974: 177), rather than the letter of it. What this makes clear is that, in interpreting the 
1R]LFNLDQSURYLVRZHGREHVWWROHDYH/RFNHEHKLQG1R]LFN¶VSURYLVRKHUHDIWHU the 
SURYLVRWKRXJKEDVHGXSRQLWOLNHO\GLIIHUVIURP/RFNH¶V 
Nozick opens his discussion of the proviso with an uncontroversial example: 
 
If I appropriate a grain of sand from Coney Island, no one else may now do as 
they wish with that grain of sand. But there are plenty of other grains of sand left 
for them to do the same with. Or if not grains of sand, then other things. 
Alternatively, the things I do with the grain of sand I appropriate might improve 
the position of others, counterbalancing their loss of the liberty to use that grain. 
The crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object worsens the 
situation of others. (1974: 175) 
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Almost all readers will agree that no wrong is done in appropriating a grain of 
sand from a beach. However, there exist some plausible cases of appropriation, 
acquisition or ownership such that injustice is done. Among others, Nozick uses the 
examples of monopolies of waterholes in deserts and of a desert island to which 
shipwrecked sailors arrive uninvited (1974: 180). In these cases, there is injustice in the 
ownership if the owners refuse others the chance to drink at their waterholes, or if they 
push the sailors back into the ocean. Both extremes ± grains of sand versus desert 
waterholes ± seem clear; the difficulties are in identifying the relevant differences 
between the two and in drawing a line between harder cases. For Nozick, the key 
question is whether the appropriation makes someone worse-off than they would be 
FRPSDUHGWRVRPHEDVHOLQH³7KHGLIILFXOW\´KRZHYHU³LQZRUNLQJVXFKDQDUJXPHQWWR
show that the proviso is satisfied is in fixing the appropriate base line for comparison. 
>«$@SSURSULDWLRQPDNHVSHRSOe no worse off that they would be how?´1R]LFN
177) Nozick himself concedes that the issue requires more examination than it is offered 
in ASU (1974: 177), but, typically, he does not return to the question. Joachim 
Wündisch is right to say that thLVGLVFXVVLRQ³OHDYHVPXFKWREHGHVLUHGDOWKRXJK WKH
IRUFH RI WKH SURYLVR REYLRXVO\ KLQJHV XSRQ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKLV YHU\ EDVHOLQH´
(2013: 206). 
 
The undemanding reading 
During his discussion of the proviso, Nozick is keen to stress the benefits of ownership, 
not for the owner of a given holding, but for others. He asks, then 
 
Is the situation of persons who are unable to appropriate (there being no more 
accessible and useful unowned object) worsened by a system allowing 
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appropriation and permanent property? Here enter the various familiar social 
considerations favoring private property: it increases the social product by 
putting means of production in the hands of those who can use them most 
efficiently (profitably); experimentation is encouraged, because with separate 
persons controlling resources, there is no one person or small group whom 
someone with a new idea must convince to try it out; private property enables 
people to decide on the pattern and types of risks they wish to bear, leading to 
specialised types of risk bearing; private property protects future persons by 
leading some to hold back resources from current consumption for future 
markets; it provides alternative sources of employment for unpopular persons 
ZKRGRQ¶WKDYHWRFRQYLQFHDQ\ one person or small group to hire them, and so 
on.  (Nozick, 1974: 177) 
 
,WLVWKURXJKFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHVHSRLQWVWKDW1R]LFNVXJJHVWVWKDW³WKHLQWHQW´
EHKLQG /RFNH¶V DUJXPHQW LV PHW 1R]LFN   :KHWKHU WKHVH DUJXPHQWV LQ
favour of ownership are sound is less important than what they are included to indicate: 
Nozick believes, and wants his readers to believe, that private property, on the whole, is 
good for people (Ryan, 1981: 338-9). It is not the purpose of this paper to endorse or 
reject No]LFN¶V DUJXPHQWV LQ IDYRXU RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ DV VXFK RQO\ WR DQDO\VH WKH
proviso. For the purposes of this paper, I will read Nozick sympathetically, and assume 
WKDWKH LV EURDGO\ FRUUHFW'DYLG6FKPLGW] FRQVLGHUV1R]LFN¶V FODLPV DQG UHFRJQLVHV
the importance of them in his observation that many of the advantages of appropriation 
are enjoyed not by the appropriators, but by future generations. Comparing the 
Americans of today with the settlers in Jamestown, Schmidtz says 
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Philosophers are taught to say, in effect, that original appropriators got the good 
stuff for free. We have to pay for ugly leftovers. But in truth, original 
appropriation benefits latecomers far more than it benefits original appropriators. 
Original appropriation is a cornucopia of wealth, but mainly for latecomers. The 
people who got there first literally could not even have imagined what we 
latecomers take for granted. Our life expectancies exceed theirs by several 
decades. (Schmidtz, 2011: 210-211) 
 
The importance that Nozick places in these claims and the way he ties them to 
the proviso suggest that his baseline is a world without appropriation. That is, particular 
ownership is unjust due to the proviso only when that ownership results in someone 
finding themselves in a worse-off situation than they would have been if there was no 
ownership at all. Further, due to the huge benefits that accrue from the institution of 
private property, Nozick believes that the proviso will rarely be applicable. It is 
important to note at this point that, while the proviso read in this way is undemanding in 
that it (supposedly) will limit acquisition only in extreme cases, it is actually rather 
demanding intellectually. This is because it requires that the lot of each individual 
person be compared to the lot of a person in some counterfactual world; this means that 
blanket declarations about the acceptability of private property are inappropriate (I shall 
return to this later). There is a further difficulty in tying the negative experience of a 
particular person to a particular acquisition. If A is in a position such that she is worse 
off in a world with acquisition than she would be in a world without acquisition, then 
she might reasonably claim that the proviso has been violated. However, identifying 
whiFK LQGLYLGXDO¶V RU JURXS¶V RZQHUVKLS RI ZKLFK KROGLQJV KDV ZRUVHQHG $¶V
VLWXDWLRQ LV QRW HDV\ ,Q 1R]LFN¶V RZQ H[DPSOHV WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ LV HDV\ EXW PRUH
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complex examples (questions about climate change, for instance, will be raised later in 
this paper) are not hard to imagine. 
The proviso, understood in this way, may sound like it has a utilitarian, and 
therefore un-libertarian, flavour (Fried, 2011: 248; Ryan, 1981: 339). Barbara Fried is 
JHQHUDOO\FULWLFDORIWKHLQWHUQDOFRQVLVWHQF\RI1R]LFN¶Vaccount of ownership, saying 
that there are at least three mutually inconsistent accounts in ASU (Fried, 2011: 232-3). 
Fried is, I suggest, broadly correct about the proviso when she says that the level of any 
compensation owed to those who are negatively DIIHFWHGE\DSSURSULDWLRQ³LV VHW WRD
level sufficient to return the expropriated to the same place on the indifference curve 
WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH RFFXSLHG LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\´   +RZHYHU
)ULHG LV LQFRUUHFWZKHQ VKH FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³1R]LFN¶VPRWLYDWLRQ IRUGRLQJDZD\ZLWK
consent is the immense utilitarian benefits to be derived from allowing private 
DSSURSULDWLRQ RXW RI WKH FRPPRQV´   1R]LFN KLPVHOI GHQLHV WKDW KH LV
making some kind of consequentialist appeal, saying that his considerations of the 
EHQHILWVRISULYDWHRZQHUVKLSHQWHU³not DVDXWLOLWDULDQMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUSURSHUW\´ 
(PSKDVLV1R]LFN¶V ,QVWHDG 1R]LFN LV DVNLQJZKHWKHU ³WKH VLWXDWLRQRISHUVRQV
who are unable to appropriate (there being no more accessible and useful unowned 
REMHFW >LV@ ZRUVHQHG E\ D V\VWHP DOORZLQJ DSSURSULDWLRQ DQG SHUPDQHQW SURSHUW\´
(Nozick, 1974: 177). The question is not whether society has benefitted from the 
institution of private property, but whether any individual person is worse off than they 
would have otherwise been (Bader, 2010: 38-9; Wündisch, 2013: 208). The former is 
significantly stricter, and allows for limits on appropriation in a great many more 
possible situations. Gerald Cohen puts it well when he says that NR]LFN¶V DUJXPHQW
³GHPDQGVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHIDWHRIHDFKSHUVRQWDNHQVHSDUDWHO\´&RKHQ$V
Cohen explains: 
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The argument is not: whatever makes people better off is a good thing, and 
private property makes people better off; but: anyone has the right to appropriate 
private property when that makes nobody worse off, and the appropriation of 
private property in general makes everyone better off (and therefore not worse 
off). (Cohen, 1995: 85) 
 
Nozick offers an argument of the same form as the proviso, though with a 
different object, in the opening pages of ASU7KHUHKH VD\V WKDW³D UDWLRQDOH IRU WKH
VWDWH¶V H[LVWHQFH´ZRXOGEH LI WKH VWDWH ³ZRXOG EH DQ LPSURYHPHQW´RQ WKH³WKHPRVW
IDYRXUHGVLWXDWLRQRIDQDUFK\´$VZULWWHQWKLVVRXQds utilitarian, but it is not 
1R]LFN UHYHDOLQJ KLV ³WUXH XWLOLWDULDQ FRORUV´ DV )ULHG VXJJHVWV   ,QVWHDG
Nozick is suggesting that if the state would be an improvement for every person 
(allowing that it may be an improvement to some only through compensation) then it 
could be justified by that alone. He clearly endorses the same form of argument in 
favour of civilisation generally. Though not everyone would be owed compensation for 
no longer being able to partake in those things that civilisation denies them, such 
FRPSHQVDWLRQ³ZRXOGEHGXHWKRVHSHUVRQVLIDQ\IRUZKRPWKHSURFHVVRIFLYLOL]DWLRQ
was a net loss, for whom the benefits of civilization did not counterbalance being 
GHSULYHGRIWKHVHSDUWLFXODUOLEHUWLHV´1R]LFN-9). Wündisch cautions that we 
should not misinterpret this comment as being about private property (2013: 207-8), and 
he is correct that private property and civilisation are different things. Wündisch, 
though, does recognise that the argument is of the same structure as the proviso (2013: 
216). 
It is perhaps due to a running-together of the separate arguments about 
civilisation and private property that Thomas Scanlon mistakenly suggests that Nozick 
should be read as suggesting that the proviso limits acquisitions or transfers in cases 
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ZKHUH WKH\ ZRXOG OHDYH ³WKLUG SDUWLHV ZRUVH RII WKHQ >VLF@ WKH\ ZHUH LQ WKH VWDWH RI
QDWXUH´7KHPDWWHULVDFWXDOO\PRUHFRPSOH[DVDZRUOGZLWKRXWRZQHUVKLS
is not necessarily a world in any particular state of nature. Instead, the baseline to which 
the proviso makes reference is the counterfactual world which makes gradual process, 
but extremely slow process due to the lack of ownership. Wündisch recognises this, 
though he is right to identify the problems with developing it, not least the possible non-
identity problems (2013: 218-9), an issue to which I shall return later in this paper. 
 
The demanding reading 
The major alternative reading of the baseline against which the proviso must be tested is 
the counterfactual world in which the specific appropriation in question did not occur. 
Richard Arneson seemingly reads Nozick in this way, as he writes that Nozick believes 
WKDW³>H@DFKSHUVRQFDQDFTXLUHIXOORZQHUVKLSRYHUXQRZQHGPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVSLHFHV
of the Earth) by staking out a claim to them, so long as her claiming ownership and 
maintaining ownership leaves others no worse off than they would have been under a 
system under which these resources remain unowned and freely available for use by 
DQ\RQH´(Pphasis mine. cf. Bader, 2010: 28-9). Vallentyne, too, writes that 
³1R]LFNLQWHUSUHWVWKLVSURYLVRDVUHTXLULQJWKDWQRRQHEHZRUVHRII«WKDQVKHZRXOG
EH LI WKH UHVRXUFH UHPDLQHG XQRZQHG´   FODLPLQJ WKDW LW LV MXVW D ³VOLS RQ
>1R]LFN¶V@SDUW´ZKHQKHDVNVLIWKHVLWXDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOVLV³ZRUVHQHGE\DV\VWHP
DOORZLQJ DSSURSULDWLRQ DQG SHUPDQHQW SURSHUW\´ 9DOOHQW\QH   FI 1R]LFN
1974: 177). If this is a slip, the purpose of the long description of the benefits of private 
property for society which immediately follows it is unclear. Elsewhere, Vallentyne 
GRHV QRW UHDG WKLV NLQG RI WKLQNLQJ DV D VOLS RQ 1R]LFN¶V SDUW EXW DV D ZD\ 1R]LFN
³VRPHWLPHV´ LQWHUSUHWV WKH SURYLVR 9DOOHQW\QH FODLPV KRZHYHU WKDW JLYHQ 1R]LFN¶V
theoretical DSSURDFK³WKLVDSSHDOWRV\VWHPVLVLQDSSURSULDWH´9DOOHQW\QHIQ
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In general, this would be true, but, as I have demonstrated, the proviso is part of a 
particular kind of argument which Nozick uses repeatedly in ASU in which systems in 
their entirety are considered, though, importantly, from an individualistic perspective. 
As such, this argument retains the spirit of libertarianism, even if a consideration of 
whole systems is unusual.1 
I will here offer three arguments against this demanding interpretation, which, 
combined with my previous arguments in favour of the undemanding interpretation, 
will hopefully demonstrate its inadequacy. First, what is striking about this reading of 
the proviso is that it is highly restULFWLYH 6FKPLGW] VD\V WKDW ³>Y@LUWXDOO\ QR RQH «
believes that any particular act of initial appropriation, in a world of scarcity, stands 
PXFKFKDQFHRIVDWLVI\LQJ´WKHSURYLVRUHDGLQWKLVZD\+HHOVHZKHUHOLVWV
Judith Thompson, Barbara Fried, Virginia Held, J. H. Bogart, Rolf Sartorius and Jeremy 
Waldron as prominent thinkers who have made this claim (Schmidtz, 2011: 210). This 
JLYHV XV JRRG UHDVRQ WR UHMHFW WKLV UHDGLQJ RI 1R]LFN¶V SURYLVR DV 1R]LFN KLPVHOI LV
                                                          
1
 
 Both Cohen and Will Kymlicka may also be read as offering this demanding reading of the 
proviso, but I suggest that their interpretation is actually not so different from my own. After correctly 
identifying that it is often hard to tell whether Nozick is interpreting Locke or developing his own proviso 
&RKHQ&RKHQVXJJHVWVWKDW WKHSURYLVR³UHTXLUHVRIDQDSSURSULDWLRQRIDQREMHFW O, which 
ZDVXQRZQHGDQGDYDLODEOHWRDOOWKDWLWVZLWKGUDZDOIURPJHQHUDOXVHGRHVQRWPDNHDQ\RQH¶VSURVSHFWV
worse than they would have been had O remained in general use´FI.\POLFND
+RZHYHU KH ODWHU JRHV RQ WR VD\ WKDW 1R]LFN PRGLILHV /RFNH¶V SURYLVR VR WKDW LW FRQVLGHUV ³QRW ZKDW
might or would have happened tout court, absent the appropriation, but what would have happened on the 
VSHFLDO K\SRWKHVLV WKDW WKH ZRUOG ZRXOG KDYH UHPDLQHG FRPPRQO\ RZQHG´ &RKHQ  
&RQIXVLQJO\ &RKHQ XVHV WKH SKUDVH ³FRPPRQO\ RZQHG´ WR PHDQ ³RZQHG E\ QR RQH´ UDWKHU WKDQ
³RZQHGE\HYHU\RQH´³1R]LFNLQWHQGVWKHUHE\´&RKHQVD\V³WRDVNZKHWKHUVXFKSHRSOHDUHZRUVHRII
WKDQ WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ KDG VXFK D V\VWHP QHYHU GHYHORSHG´   .\POLFND WRR GHVSLWH
sometimes appearing to believe differently (e.g. 2002: 115-6), stresses that the tragedy of the commons 
GLVSOD\VWKDW³YLUWXDOO\DQ\V\VWHPRISURSHUW\RZQHUVKLS´PHHWVWKHSURYLVR 
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quite clear that he believes ³WKDWWKHIUHHRSHUDWLRQRIDPDUNHWV\VWHPZLOOQRWDFWXDOO\
UXQDIRXO´RIWKHSURYLVR6HFRQG:QGLVFKRIIHUVDVFHQDULRWRFKDOOHQJH
WKLV³OHQLHQW´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSURYLVR,PDJLQHDZRUOGLQZKLFK$DQG
B have logging businesses, and in which C, tired of the high price of timber, claims a 
forest for herself. This seems to be a perfectly reasonable Nozickian scenario. However, 
in entering the market, C causes the price of wood to drop, worsening the position of A 
and B. It is clear that A and B would be better off in a world in which C had not 
appropriated the woodland, but it seems highly strange to suggest (or read Nozick as 
suggesting) that they are therefore owed compensation from C. Third, Nozick is quite 
careful in the examples that he chooses of cases in which a claim of ownership is 
LOOHJLWLPDWH +H LV FRQFHUQHG WKDW WKH SURYLVR VKRXOG ³KDQGOH FRUUHFWO\ WKH FDVHV
(objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone appropriates the total 
supply of something nHFHVVDU\IRUOLIH´$VVXFKKLVH[DPSOHVFRQFHUQQRW
whether someone appropriates (for example) the total supply of emeralds in the world, 
RUDOORIWKHPRVWEHDXWLIXOEHDFKHVEXW³DOO WKHGULQNDEOHZDWHULQ WKHZRUOG´DOO WKH
waterholes in a desert, or the entirety of an island on which castaways (through no fault 
of their own) find themselves (Nozick, 1974: 179-80). It is true that A is made worse off 
if she wants an emerald, but all emeralds happen to be owned by B, who does not want 
to sell them. This is the kind of situation which would be made illegitimate by the 
lenient interpretation of the proviso, but it is very noticeably not the kind of scenario 
that Nozick uses. I suggest that Nozick uses these life and death situations precisely 
because they are the only sort of situation in which individuals are left worse off than 
WKH\ ZRXOG EH LQ D K\SRWKHWLFDO ZRUOG IUHH RI DSSURSULDWLRQ ³>7@KH EDVHOLQH IRU
FRPSDULVRQ´1R]LFNWHOOVXV³LVVRORZDVFRPSDUHGWRWKHSURGXFWLYHQHVVRIDVRFLHWy 
with private appropriation that the question of [the proviso] being violated arises only in 
the case of catastrophe (or a desert-LVODQGVLWXDWLRQ´1R]LFN-1). 
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The proviso and non-human animals 
,KDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGZK\,LQWHUSUHW1R]LFN¶VSURviso as a protection from instances of 
ownership that place someone in a position such that they would be better off in a world 
IUHH RI DSSURSULDWLRQ +RZHYHU , QRZ ZLVK WR FULWLFDOO\ H[DPLQH 1R]LFN¶V RZQ
suggestion, with which I finished the previous secWLRQWKDW³WKHEDVHOLQHIRUFRPSDULVRQ
is so low as compared to the productiveness of a society with private appropriation that 
WKH TXHVWLRQ RI >WKH SURYLVR@ EHLQJ YLRODWHG DULVHV RQO\ LQ WKH FDVH RI FDWDVWURSKH´
(1974: 180-1). At least initially, this seems to be correct. In day to day life, even in a 
K\SRWKHWLFDO KLJKO\ RSSUHVVLYH FDSLWDOLVWLF VRFLHW\ LW LV KDUG WR LPDJLQH WKDW $¶V
ownership of a particular holding could be so bad that B would be better off living in a 
world without any appropriation, gLYHQ1R]LFN¶VFODLPVDERXW WKHSURGXFWLYHQHVVRID
society with private ownership (which I am accepting for the purposes of this 
argument). One way to challenge Nozick is to find a group of individual rights-bearers 
who do not share in the immense benefits of appropriation which he considers near-
universal. If such a group is found, then, we might assume, the proviso can actually be 
highly demanding: as members of such a group do not experience the benefits of 
appropriation generally, any appropriation which has a negative impact upon any one of 
them will leave her in a position such that she would be better-off in a world without 
appropriation. This means that such an appropriation would be in violation of the 
proviso. 
It is my contention that this group of individual rights-bearers who do not share 
in the benefits of private property are non-human animals. Right libertarian political 
theorists are generally somewhat hostile to animal ethics, with works from Nozick 
(1997: 205-10), and other prominent right libertarians like Jan Narveson (1977, 1983, 
1987, 1989, 1999) and Tibor Machan (1985, 1991, 2002, 2004), challenging animal 
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rights positions, sometimes aggressively. However, in a number of places, Nozick 
himself said positive things about the moral status of non-human animals,2 and theorists 
DUHQRZVWDUWLQJ WR FRQVLGHU WKHSRVVLELOLW\RID ³OLEHUWDULDQDQLPDO ULJKWV´ (EHUWDQG
Machan, 2012). Importantly, Nozick is able to offer no political protection to non-
human animals, something he strongly implies he wishes to do (1974: 38-9), unless he 
is willing to extend rights to them. This is because, for Nozick, rights represent the 
whole of political philosophy, which is a subset of moral philosophy concerning what 
can be demanded or enforced, rather than merely recommended, which is the domain of 
moral-but-not-political philosophy (Nozick, 1981: 499-503; Vallentyne, 2011: 147; 
Wolff, 2003: 22). As such, there is potentially an argument to be made that Nozick was 
willing to extend certain rights to (at least some) non-human animals, but pursuing this 
point will take us from our topic. The reader does not need to commit to the idea that 
Nozick supported animal rights in order to explore this issue here. Suffice it to say that 
there are a large number of other academics and activists, including a growing number 
RI SROLWLFDO WKHRULVWV LQFOXGLQJ WKLV SDSHU¶V DXWKRU ZKR GR XQHTXLYRFDOO\ VXSSRUW
                                                          
2 
 +H ZDV TXLWH FOHDU WKDW WKH\ ³FRXQW IRU VRPHWKLQJ´ 1R]LFN   DQG FRQVLGHUHG WKH
treatment of non-human animals an important matter (Nozick, 1997: 109-10). In his personal life, he was 
certainly a moral vegetarian, and perhaps a moral vegan (cf. Nozick, 1981: 523). 1R]LFN¶V RIW-quoted 
PD[LPRI ³XWLOLWDULDQLVP IRU DQLPDOV.DQWLDQLVP IRUSHRSOH´ LV E\KLV RZQDGPLVVLRQ ³WRRPLQLPDO´
(1,QGHHGKHVD\VWKDW³>H@YHQIRUDQLPDOVXWLOLWDULDQLVPZRQ¶WGRDVWKHZKROHVWRU\EXWWKH
WKLFNHWRITXHVWLRQVGDXQWVXV´1R]LFN¶VVXEVHTXHQWGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHVWDWXVRIQRQ-human 
animals do not make reference to this maxim. These discussions include an exploration of assessing 
PRUDOVWDWXVLQWHUPVRI³RUJDQLFXQLW\´1R]LFN-9, 440-4; Nozick, 2006: 162-6; cf. Arenson, 
2011: 32-3; Nozick, 1981: 451) and a cautious endorsement of ahimsa and nonviolence towards all 
sentient beings (Nozick, 2001: 280-2; Nozick, 2006: 212-4). As such, there is no reason to privilege the 
QRWLRQ RI ³XWLOLWDULDQLVP IRU DQLPDOV´ ZKLFK 1R]LFN GLG QRW WUXO\ HQGRUVH KLPVHOI ZKHQ ZH DUH
discussing the place of non-KXPDQDQLPDOVLQ1R]LFN¶VSKLORVRphy. There is more to be said about this 
important issue, but constraints of space mean that it can be discussed no further here. 
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extending rights to non-human animals. The problem is this: if some non-human 
animals are rights-bearers, that is, beings entitled to political protection, then there 
seems to be no reason why they should be excluded from the protection of the proviso. 
If a rights-bearing non-human animal (say, a pig) is made worse-off by a particular 
appropriation to the extent that she would be better off in a world without appropriation, 
that appropriation is illegitimate. While some (but by no means all) non-human animal 
companions may be understood to have benefitted from the institution of private 
property in the way Nozick understands humans to have done so, the vast majority of 
free-living non-human animals experience no benefits from private property. This 
means that any appropriation which negatively affects them will be in violation of the 
proviso, and, importantly, may not be something for which compensation can easily be 
provided. 
Let us consider a simple example. A corporation acquires a large area of 
woodland containing a number of rights-bearing non-human animals with the intention 
of destroying it. Grant the plausible assumptions that industrialised logging (possible 
only because of historical appropriation) will have a more adverse effect on the resident 
non-human animals than gathering wood by hand, and that said non-human animals 
have experienced few if any of the benefits of private ownership that Nozick attributes 
to humans in general. The corporation now risks harming the non-human animals to the 
extent that they would be better off living in a world in which there was no 
appropriation. However, these non-human animals cannot be adequately compensated 
with some kind of financial restitution. Even if the Nozickian takes the step of assuming 
WKDWDOPRVWDOOLQMXULHVDQGORVVHVH[FOXGLQJWKHORVVRIRQH¶VRZQOLIHFDQLQSULQFLSOH
be compensated in the human case, it is not clear how she could sensibly take the same 
approach concerning non-human animals. Options open to the corporation, if they are 
keen to continue with their logging operation, may include enhancing an area of the 
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woodland so that the non-human animals can live more comfortably (though they have 
less space) or moving the non-human animals to some other location (taking care not to 
harm either the beings moved or the beings already resident in the new location). These 
are not strictly acts of compensation to rectify a violation of the proviso, but attempts to 
limit harm so that the proviso is not violated to begin with. What is obvious is that both 
of these possibilities are extremely costly to the corporation, requiring significant time, 
expertise and resources. However, if the corporation is unwilling or unable to engage in 
them (or something like them) then the ownership of the woodland is in violation of the 
proviso. And this is the case even though the proviso has been understood in the 
undemanding way ± the way that Nozick himself assumed would mean it was rarely 
applicable. 
The proviso, then, if applied to non-human animals in a parallel way to how it is 
applied to humans, can actually serve as a highly demanding constraint on the free 
exercise of appropriation and ownership. The idea can be taken further, as there are 
ways that ownership can affect non-human animals completely unlike the way it affects 
humans. Take the interest-based rights approach of Alasdair Cochrane (2012), who 
argues that though non-human animals possess certain key rights (such as, in most 
circumstances, the right not to be killed or used in painful ways) they possess no right 
against being owned. $GGLQJ 1R]LFN¶V SURYLVR WR WKLV IUDPHZRUN ZRXOG DOORZ
protection of owned non-human animals beyond simply the protection of their negative 
rights. Specifically, owned non-human animals would have to be granted opportunities 
for positive experiences such that they were no worse off as property than they would 
be if they lived in a world without ownership, and so were unowned. It would therefore 
pro tanto be illegitimate to keep a companion dog (Helen) in such a small space that she 
experienced significant frustration, to feed her a diet which left her malnourished and 
sickly, or to deny her contact with other dogs. If a person was to treat Helen thus, they 
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ZRXOGEHLQYLRODWLRQRIWKHSURYLVRXQOHVVWKH\ZHUHDEOHWRDGHTXDWHO\µFRPSHQVDWH¶
her for her loss of these freedoms. For instance, to counterbalance the denial of contact 
ZLWK RWKHU GRJV +HOHQ¶V RZQHUV FRXOG DOORZ KHU FRQVLGHUDEOH FRQWDFW ZLWK KXPDn 
children; Helen and the children could play together, exercise together and have a 
loving relationship with one another. In this case, while Helen has lost something 
WKURXJKDQRWKHU¶VRZQHUVKLSRIDSDUWLFXODUKROGLQJ VSHFLILFDOO\DQRWKHU¶VRZQHUVKLS
of her), she seems to be in a better (or, at least, no worse) position than she would be in 
a world without any ownership at all. 
 
Anthropogenic climate change 
In the case of Helen and the case of the woodland, matters are relatively simple. The 
issue becomes significantly more complex in the case of anthropogenic climate change. 
This is because it is a situation in which rights-holders are adversely affected by the 
actions of others, possible only because of their ownership of certain holdings 
(buildings, vehicles and so forth) in which identifying a particular responsible 
relationship of ownership is impossible. Let us take a concrete example. The state of 
Kirbati is comprised of dozens of low-lying islands in the central Pacific. Anote Tong, 
.LUEDWL¶VSUHVident, was recently quoted in The New Yorker as saying that ³>D@FFRUGLQJ
to the projections, within this century, the water will be higher than the highest point in 
RXUODQGV´0RUDLV$VVXPLQJWKDWWKLVLVFRUUHFWWKHSHRSOHRI.LUEDWLZLOOVRRQ
be without a home, due to industrialisation elsewhere in the world. This industrialisation 
is possible only thanks to private ownership, and so the humans of Kiribati might 
reasonably appeal to the proviso; if they are left to drown, and perhaps even if they are 
rescued but then abandoned, they would have fared better in a world without 
appropriation. The ownership which has led to this situation is thus unjust. In the case of 
the human inhabitants of Kiribati, the proviso is fairly demanding, though not 
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overwhelmingly so. Some agent or group of agents could take responsibility for 
supporting the people of Kiribati in their diaspora, or could support the building of 
defences to protect the islands themselves. Take Teima, an inhabitant of Kiribati. 
According to the proviso, Teima would be owed only enough to ensure that her life 
goes no worse than it would in a world without appropriation. Given that Teima has 
already benefitted from the institution of private property (the technological, distributive 
and economic structures of Kiribati are only successful because of historical and current 
ownership), this is incredibly minimal. Specifically, Teima would probably only be 
owed transport from the island and subsequent access to the various benefits of private 
property Nozick identifies. Simply ensuring that Teima was transported to (for 
example) Australia, probably with her family and either with her belongings or with 
some small financial compensation for her loss, would likely be sufficient according to 
the undemanding reading of the proviso.  
Initially, it seems that identifying the agent or agents responsible for ensuring 
that Teima, and the other people of Kiribati, are transported from the island and/or 
minimally compensated for the trouble they have received is exceedingly difficult, as it 
seems that a great number of relations of ownership are together causally responsible 
IRU 7HLPD¶V VLWXDWLRQ 6XFK FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LV QRW VWULFWO\ UHTXLUHG KRZHYHU SURYLGLQJ
that somebody ensures that Teima would not fare better in a world without appropriation 
WKDQ VKH GRHV LQ WKLV ZRUOG QR RZQHUVKLS LV LQ YLRODWLRQ RI WKH SURYLVR RQ 7HLPD¶V
DFFRXQW &RPSDUH ,PDJLQH $GDPV¶V OLIH ZDV VLJQLILFDQWO\ ZRUVHQHG E\ 6PLWK¶V
RZQHUVKLS RI $ DQG -RQHV¶V RZQHUVKLS RI % VXFK WKDW $GDPV ZRXOG IDUH EHWWHU LQ D
world wiWK QR DSSURSULDWLRQ $VVXPH WKDW 6PLWK¶V RZQHUVKLS RI $ DQG -RQHV¶V
ownership of B are equally problematic for Adams, but neither is individually so 
problematic that it alone would violate the proviso. Assume also that Adams could be 
adequately compensated by a payment of no less than £10,000. In this situation, the 
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most equitable way for Adams to be compensated would be for Smith and Jones to pay 
$GDPV  HDFK +RZHYHU WKLV LV QRW QHFHVVDU\ IURP $GDPV¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ DV
Adams is adequately compensated no matter where the £10,000 comes from. Thus, if 
6PLWK SDLG $GDPV  WKLV ZRXOG PHDQ 6PLWK¶V RZQHUVKLS RI $ ZDV QR ORQJHU
XQMXVWDQGLWZRXOGDOVRSUHYHQW-RQHV¶VRZQHUVKLSRI%IURPEHLQJXQMXVW1DWXUDOO\
this would even hold if Thompson compensated Adams, despite the fact that Thompson 
has had no dealings with Adams, Smith or Jones previously. It is not the act of 
compensation which is important, but the goodness that the compensation provides.) 
Importantly, if no agent was able or willing to ensure that Smith was adequately 
compensated, this makes all UHVSRQVLEOHUHODWLRQVKLSVRIRZQHUVKLSLOOHJLWLPDWH6PLWK¶V
RZQHUVKLSRI$DQG-RQHV¶VRZQHUVKLSRI%DUHERWKXQMXVW 
I now return to Teima and Kiribati. If no one was willing to rescue/compensate 
KHUDOO UHODWLRQVKLSVRIRZQHUVKLSZKLFKKDYHFRQWULEXWHG WR7HLPD¶VVLWXDWLRQZRXOG
be unjust. Thus, every ownership which contributes to climate change ± for instance, 
every ownership of a car regularly driven, every ownership of a factory which produces 
greenhouse gases, and every ownership of electrical goods powered by the burning of 
fossil fuels ± would be illegitimate. It would therefore be in the rational interests of all 
those who owned such things to ensure that Teima, and the other people of Kiribati, are 
adequately compensated. If they fail to do so, their ownership would be unjust. 
Now consider the non-human animals of Kiribati. I shall focus on the endemic 
bokikokiko, or Kiritimati reed warbler (Acrocephalus aequinoctilis). When Kiribati 
³VLQNV´ LQGLYLGXDOZDUEOHUVZLOOVHHWKHLUKRPHVDQG LQGHHGDOO ODQGWKH\KDYHHYHU
known) destroyed, irretrievably. It is clear that any given warbler living freely on 
Kiribati would fare better in a world without any appropriation if left to drown. We can 
conceive of some parallel actions being taken with the warblers of Kiribati as could be 
taken with the humans of Kiribati, and as was explored in the woodland case. The 
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warblers could be captured before being transported to some other warbler-friendly 
environment, taking care not to disrupt the wildlife (if any) at the new location. Unlike 
the humans of Kiribati, it seems safe to assume that the warblers have received no 
EHQHILWV DOUHDG\ IURP WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ 7KHUHIRUH WR ³FRPSHQVDWH´
these warblers for the stress, both physical and mental, likely involved in the transport 
process, their new habitat would have to be preferable for them to how Kiribati would 
be in a world without appropriation. If this last step is not taken, then the lives of the 
warblers are still worse than they would have been in a world without appropriation, 
DQG VR WKH ZDUEOHUV¶ DGYRFDWHV ZRXOG VWLOO EH DEOH WR DSSHDO WR WKH SURYLVR ,I WKH
comparison is between an entire life on Kiribati, or a life on Kiribati, followed by stress, 
followed by a life somewhere as good as Kiribati, then clearly a life in a world without 
appropriation is preferable. If, however, the comparison is between an entire life on 
Kiribati, or a life on Kiribati, followed by stress, followed by a life somewhere better 
than Kiribati, then the world without appropriation is not clearly preferable for the 
warblers, and so the proviso is not violated. 
2QFHDJDLQWKHSURYLVRHYHQLWV³XQGHPDQGLQJ´IRUPLVUHYHDOHGWREHKLJKO\
demanding. The warblers of Kiribati must be rescued and transported to a (very highly) 
appropriate new home. Not only that, but each individual warbler must be rescued; the 
proviso requires that attention is paid to each individual, not merely collectives. If no 
one is prepared to fund this rescue and rehoming effort, then all relationships of 
ownership minimally responsible for the plight of the warblers (that is, all those 
contributing to anthropogenic climate change) are unjust. If such a rescue is impossible, 
then this suggests that all such relationships of ownership are illegitimate anyway. To 
put this another way, such relationships of ownership, even without directly violating 
rights, would have already made the life of at least one rights-bearing being worse than 
it would have been in a world without appropriation, and made it worse in such a way 
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that said being cannot be adequately compensated. This means that the proviso is, 
potentially, not merely highly demanding, but radically demanding, calling into 
question a great many relationships of ownership. Bernard Williams once observed that 
1R]LFN¶VHQWLWOHPHQWWKHRU\RIMXVWLFHLVQHLWKHUDIULHQGRIFDSLWDOLVPDVLWLVSUDFWLFHG
today, nor of how some right libertarians would like to see it practiced.  The theory, he 
suggested, actually shows how almost all that is owned today is owned illegitimately 
(1981: 35-6) In another classic paper, David Lyons (1981) explored the idea that a 
Nozickian right libertarian should demand a return of much of the United States to the 
descendants of unjustly treated Native Americans. Perhaps, similar to how these authors 
view the entitlement theory, the proviso shows us the deep injustice involved in almost 
all actually-existing ownership. If this is so, then the demandingness of the proviso, 
contrary to what Nozick himself thought, is comparable to the demandingness of any 
theory radically critical of private property. 
 
Possible objections 
I shall now consider some possible objections to my above analysis.3 One might object 
that applying the proviso to Helen is not possible. Assume Helen is a border collie, a 
popular dog breed for companionship and agricultural purposes. Border collies were 
first bred at the beginning of the 20th century, and such selective breeding was possible 
only because dogs were the property of humans, and only desired because sheep were 
the property of humans. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that Helen could not 
exist in a world without appropriation. As such, the application of the proviso to non-
human animals runs up against the non-identity problem (NIP). Importantly, however, 
                                                          
3 
 I shall not consider the obvious counter that non-human animals are not rights-bearers, and so 
cannot be protected by the proviso. Such an objection is too great to be dealt with here.  
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the proviso also encounters the NIP concerning humans (Wündisch, 2013: 218-9). A 
world without appropriation would have a significantly different history to our current 
world; even though people like Smith may exist in a world without appropriation, Smith 
herself would not, meaning that the NIP poses a striking challenge to the proviso even 
before the introduction of non-KXPDQ DQLPDOV 1R]LFN¶V DUJXPHQW FRXOG SHUKDSV EH
rescued by DVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHSURYLVRLVQRWWUXO\FRPSDULQJ$¶VVLWXDWLRQLQDZRUOG
with acquisition to how A would have fared in a world without acquisition, but 
FRPSDULQJ $¶V VLWXDWLRQ QRZ ZLWK WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI $1, who lives in a world without 
acquisition and who is sufficiently similar to A. Under this reframing, if someone 
sufficiently similar to A could not exist in a world without appropriation, A could not be 
protected by the proviso. Take Smith, a paradigmatic human adult in our world. 
Someone sufficiently similar to Smith in a world without appropriation would have 
comparable physical, social and mental attributes; this other person, Smith1, would not 
be Smith, but the goodness of Smith1¶VOLIHLQWKHZRUOGZLWKRXWDSSURSULDWLRQZRXOGEH
the appropriate SRLQW RI FRPSDULVRQ IRU WKH JRRGQHVV RI 6PLWK¶V OLIH LQ RXU ZRUOG ,I
Smith is sufficiently disadvantaged by some instance of ownership such that Smith1¶V
OLIH LV EHWWHU WKDQ 6PLWK¶V WKHQ 6PLWK PLJKW UHDVRQDEO\ DSSHDO WR WKH SURYLVR WR
illustrate the injustice of that ownership. 
$SSO\LQJWKLVWR+HOHQZHFRPSDUHWKHJRRGQHVVLQ+HOHQ¶VOLIHWRWKHJRRGQHVV
of Helen1¶V OLIH7KRXJK+HOHQ1 could not be a border collie, she may be a free-living 
wolf or dingo; wolves, dingoes and border collies are of the same species, with more or 
less comparable life histories and faculties. Assuming Helen is a fairly typical border 
collie, Helen1 would be a wolf or dingo with many collie-like traits. When applying the 
proviso to Helen, we will ask not how Helen would fare in a world without 
appropriation, as Helen could not exist in a world without appropriation, but how 
Helen1 would fare in a world without appropriation. The Helen/Helen1 comparison may 
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not differ substantially from the Smith/Smith1 comparison. It is conceivable that the 
arrival of Europeans in the United States was possible only because of the institution of 
private property, and so, if Smith happens to be of mixed European/Native American 
heritage, Smith has a heritage which it would be impossible for Smith1 to possess,  just 
as Helen has a heritage which Helen1 cannot have. If the proviso cannot protect Helen 
because of the NIP, then it cannot protect many humans for the same reason. I hold, 
however, that this slight reformulation allows the proviso to sidestep the NIP while still 
keeping its character and appeal. 
While it is one thing to say that we can conceive of a being sufficiently like 
Helen in a world without appropriation, it is another to say that we can conceive of a 
being sufficiently like (OOLH D FKLFNHQ NHSW IRU HJJ SURGXFWLRQ (OOLH OLNH DOO ³OD\LQJ
KHQV´ DQG DOO RWKHU DQLPDOV RWKHU IDUPHG IRU IOHVK PLON DQG HJJV KDV EHHQ EUHG WR
become an animal machine. Ellie lays ten times as many eggs as Ellie1 (the most similar 
being to Ellie in a world without appropriation) would, leading to extremely brittle 
bones (as Ellie uses up a disproportionate amount of calcium for the production of egg-
shells), internal problems (her reproductive system is not well-adapted to produce so 
many eggs, resulting in uterine prolapses and other issues) and a completely different 
life history (even ignoring her confinement and slaughter, which are the issues at stake, 
Ellie begins laying eggs long before Ellie1 would). Ellie and Ellie1 do not seem to be 
sufficiently similar in the way that Smith and Smith1 are, or even the way that Helen and 
Helen1 are. As such, to say that Ellie, due to some relationship(s) of ownership O, is 
worse off in a world with appropriation than Ellie1 would be in a world without 
appropriation is not to say to say that O violates the proviso. As Ellie and Ellie1 are not 
sufficiently similar, trying to use the proviso to protect Ellie would be like claiming that 
O violates the proviso because it leaves Smith worse off than Jones1. Such a claim 
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completely changes the character of the proviso, meaning that it loses much of its 
appeal. 
As such, under my conservative reformulation, Ellie has no recourse to the 
proviso: she exists only due to private property, and so it is meaningless to ask how her 
life would go in a world without private property, and we cannot even ask how the life 
of someone sufficiently similar to her would go. This is not, however, to say that Ellie is 
doomed to her grim life as a laying hen. While it seems that the proviso can offer her no 
protection as conceptualised, the proviso is logically subsequent to basic negative rights. 
This means that someone seeking to protect Ellie cannot appeal to the proviso (as 
someone seeking to protect Helen may), but they could easily apSHDOWR(OOLH¶VULJKWV,W
is not the purpose of this paper to develop or defend a Nozickian list of negative 
DQLPDOULJKWV+RZHYHUZHFDQVD\WKDWHYHQLI(OOLH¶VULJKWVDUHQRWYLRODWHGE\KHU
being owned, her owner could easily be said to violate her rights by cutting her beak, 
keeping her in a highly cramped environment or sending her to slaughter, all of which 
DUH VWDQGDUG LQ LQGXVWULDO LQFOXGLQJ³IUHH-UDQJH´HJJSURGXFWLRQ(YHQ LI WKHSURYLVR
cannot protect Ellie in the way it can protect Helen and Smith, Ellie does not need the 
proviso in order to still command respect as a being in her own right. The proviso is 
intended to protect rights-bearers beyond their basic negative rights; it does not replace 
their rights. 
At no point does Nozick write as if the proviso protects non-human animals in 
the way I have argued it could, but, assuming that non-human animals have rights, there 
VHHPV QR JRRG UHDVRQ WR H[FOXGH WKHP IURP WKH SURYLVR¶V SURWHFWLRQ 7R FRXQWHU
another possible objection, it is important to note that we cannot simply say that a world 
without appropriation would be unkind to non-human animals as humans would hunt 
and kill them, thus saying that our current world (or a given hypothetical world) is 
better for non-human animals because they do not face some (or all) of the persecution 
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for human resources that they would otherwise face. When Nozick asks whether the 
state will be preferable to the state of nature for everyone involved, which I have 
already argued employs the same form of argument as the proviso, he says we must 
 
focus upon a nonstate situation in which people generally satisfy moral 
constraints and generally act as they ought. Such an assumption is not wildly 
optimistic; it does not assume that all people act exactly as they should. Yet this 
state-of-nature situation is the best anarchic situation one reasonably could hope 
for. Hence investigating its nature and defects is of crucial importance to 
deciding whether there should be a state rather than anarchy. (Nozick, 1974: 5) 
 
So, too, here; we must compare the situation of non-human animals in a state 
without appropriation in which people generally respect the rules they should, which 
includes a general respect for non-human animal rights-bearers. When we compare this 
situation with current practices, even current practices minus the obviously rights-
violating industries such as pastoral husbandry, a great many practices are potentially 
open to critique on the grounds that they violate the proviso. 
 
Concluding remarks 
I have argXHG WKDW LQ WHUPV RI FRUUHFWO\ LQWHUSUHWLQJ 1R]LFN¶V WKRXJKW WKH SURYLVR
should be read in the undemanding way; i.e., ownership (through appropriation or 
acquisition) is unjust if it leaves some other rights-bearer in a worse position than they 
would be LQ D ZRUOG ZLWKRXW DQ\ DSSURSULDWLRQ +RZHYHU FRQWUDU\ WR 1R]LFN¶V RZQ
view, I have suggested that, even when read in this way, the proviso may remain very 
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demanding. This is because of a way it may relate to non-human animals. If non-human 
animals have rights, and there are many reasons for us to believe that they do, then there 
seems to be no reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso. Importantly, 
however, the vast majority of non-human animals do not share in the immense benefits 
offered by a society in which appropriation, acquisition and ownership are possible, 
even assuming that Nozick is correct about these benefits in the case of the vast 
majority of humans. As such, the baseline against which the lives of non-human animals 
must be compared is not the very high one against which we compare the lives of 
humans living in a world of appropriation, but the very low one of how well-off a given 
non-human animal might be expected to be in a world in which humans exist, but do not 
own anything. 
The consequences of this are radical. I have explored three kinds of cases in 
which the proviso can offer significant protection to non-human animals, either limiting 
what humans may do with that which they own, demanding costly and difficult 
³FRPSHQVDWRU\´ SURJUDPPHV IURP KXPDQV WR FHUWDLQ QRQ-human animals, or else 
calling into question the justice of a great many of our holdings. These cases were the 
example of human ownership of, and subsequent destruction or modification of, non-
human animal habitats, human ownership of non-human animals themselves, and, most 
problematically of all, destruction of non-human animal homes due to anthropogenic 
climate change, something possible only because of relationships of ownership. It is this 
final concern, more than any of the others, which calls into question almost the entire 
institution of private property. If humans are unable to protect rights-bearing non-
human animals from being killed or harmed as a result of anthropogenic climate change, 
the proviso calls into question the justice of all of our ownership which has led to 
FOLPDWHFKDQJH7KLVZRXOGPHDQWKDWWKHSURYLVRHYHQRQLWV³XQGHPDQGLQJ´UHDGLQJ
is about as demanding as a constraint on private property can be. 
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